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  • eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

    Case 22: Symbol Technologies (2004)

    Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann
    …in a variety of channel stuffing, known at the company as “three way candy deals”. It paid off smaller resellers to “purchase” Symbol products from a… …crimes (see SEC 2004): – They employed multiple schemes for claiming revenue before it was earned, such as shipping the wrong product when the… …to refrain from scanning new components or returned goods into SAP. Moreover, they arranged transactions with third parties to make it appear that… …Symbol had sold inventory when, in fact, it retained possession of the goods. – Finally, the manipulation of stock option exercise dates had a… …established unrealistic financial performance targets, and he made it clear to executives and employees at all levels that they were expected to do whatever… …it took to achieve those figures. According to the SEC, “there was often a mad scramble at the end of reporting periods to hit the numbers”. Many… …and made a strong commitment “to root out fraud”. It realized that Symbol’s only way to continue as a business was to sever all ties to those engaged… …it agreed to pay a USD 37 million penalty and continue a program to tighten its accounting controls. As part of its settlement of private shareholder…
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  • eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

    Case 9: Cendant/CUC (1998)

    Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann
    …revenue and ex- pense recognition policies followed the matching principle. But in retrospect, it became clear that this was not the case. CUC sold club… …solicitation costs to future periods. In other words, it recorded the revenue early and the expenses later. Thus, the company was able to successfully boost… …totally fictitious, including, for exam- ple, USD 500 million over the three-year period from fiscal 1995 to 1997. One fraud investigator commented: “It… …, each quarter, senior management would review the opportunities available for inflating the company’s earnings, and it would determine how many… …who had served under Forbes and Shelton at CUC. On April 15, 1998, the fraud was disclosed to the public: Cendant announced that it had dis- covered… …“accounting irregularities” and that it expected to lower its 1997 earnings. The disclosures sent Cendant stock into a tailspin: the stock price dropped 46% in… …covered it up. The auditors, however, denied the allegations, but agreed to pay USD 335 mil- lion to settle litigation. Ultimately, Cendant sued Walter A… …Corigliano. “It was a culture that had been developing over many years,” Corigliano said in a statement, emphasizing that they had been following orders. “It… …September 2006, it split into four companies. Its real estate and hotel businesses were spun off as stand-alone companies, and a third company, Travelport…
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  • eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

    Case 2: ZZZZ Best Company (1987)

    Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann
    …started his own rug-cleaning business and called it “ZZZZ Best” (pronounced “Zee Best”). Minkow soon learned that carpet-cleaning was a difficult way to… …company and collect insurance money. He stole his grandmother’s jewel- lery and sold it for USD 2,000. When he urgently needed cash in 1984, he forged… …had been committing fraud. When he wasn’t directly stealing money, he was raising it fraudulently. Nonethe- less, he was able to expand his company and… …“carpet-cleaning king of California”, he slacked on his schoolwork, hired more employees and made it on to the local television news. The publicity began to… …you have revenue. When you have revenue, you have income.” As in many of the more recent corporate scandals, it was not the auditors who… …, the auditors scared Minkow by ask- ing him three months later to see the finished project. But Minkow pulled it off again, by re-renting the still… …unfinished building and, astonishingly, completing it in Accounting Fraud in U.S. Companies 32 just 20 days, at a cost of USD 2 million. It was a… …individuals involved in the restora- tion contract.” ZZZZ Best became unravelled almost as rapidly as it rose. In June 1987, just two days before it was… …bankruptcy, though the ZZZZ Best name was so tarnished by then that it is unlikely it would have been able to stay in business in any case. Investors lost a… …counts of racketeering, securities fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion and bank fraud. It also accused Minkow of setting up dummy companies, writing phony…
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  • eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

    Case 37: Siemens (Germany, 2006)

    Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann
    …transactions – payments where it was impossible to identify who received them or what services had been provided. Prosecutors in Italy, Liechtenstein and… …the raid, officials in the United States began investigating the case as well, not least because Siemens is listed on the NYSE. Knowing that it… …faced steep fines unless it cooperated, Siemens hired international law firm Debevoise & Plimpton to work with federal investigators and to conduct an… …division. Later in December, Siemens provided its first estimate of the extent of the scandal, saying it could reach EUR 420 million. But analysts pointed… …and the power genera- tion arm (which paid about USD 300 million in bribes). Altogether, it cost Siemens more than USD 2.6 billion to clear its name… …contracts were at the heart of the bribery scheme. In order to understand why Siemens was so susceptible to corruption, it is necessary to go back to the… …internal compliance department knew of the ongoing black money scandal. “It was a system of organized irresponsibility that was implicitly con- doned,” said… …series of industry trends and suffered from a collapse in overall demand. “It was about keeping the business unit alive and not jeopardizing thousands… …of jobs overnight. We all knew what we did was unlawful. But we thought we had to do it. Otherwise, we would ruin the company.” Thus, Siekaczek… …justified his wrongdoing as economic necessity. It is certainly worth delving into his insider’s account (see NYT December 21, 2008): – From 2002 to 2006…
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  • eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

    Case 8: Sunbeam (1998)

    Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann
    …relied on question- able accounting gimmicks and outright fraud to enhance earnings. It happened under the direction of now disgraced CEO Albert J… …write-off as it closed plants and laid off employees, but its re- ported profits soared in 1997, persuading many analysts that Dunlap had turned the company… …investors had bid the stock so high that it did not appear to be a good value, even if the reported profits were accurate (though they did not turn out to… …attractive than it actually was to potential buyers: “This Accounting Fraud in U.S. Companies 64 was a primer in the techniques of financial fraud, in… …, he wanted X dollars in profit, and go get it.” Dunlap had always assured him that the exaggerated profits could be made up, and the falsifica- tions… …tough and powerful CEO is a pattern that frequently crops up in accounting fraud. “It is a fairly common theme to have a personality like ‘Chainsaw Al’… …Dunlap’s corporate carrier in his book “Chainsaw”, made it clear: “Dunlap’s so-called turnaround of Sunbeam in 1997 was little more than a manufactured… …turning underperforming companies around. It is perhaps noteworthy that during his 23-month reign at Sunbeam, Dunlap cut about half of the 12,000…
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  • eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

    Case 11: American Tissue (2001)

    Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann
    …the books – in what the indictment later said was a futile effort to gain new Accounting Fraud in U.S. Companies 76 financing, even as it was… …contained the material misrep- resentation that the company was in compliance with its loan covenants with its lenders (when it was not), and omitted to… …the same time, Gabayzadeh and Elghanayan set up a labyrinth of 45 companies, described as affiliates of American Tissue, but held apart from it by the… …affiliated companies down with it. Money moved all around these related companies – and away from creditors, as the suit later alleged. By September 30, 2000… …. In a separate lawsuit, Elghanayan was accused of constructing a transaction that saw ATI buy machinery for USD 3.3 million, and then sell it to… …Elghanayan for USD 1 two months later. Gabayzadeh and Elghanayan were later alleged to have used American Tissue’s treasury as if it was their personal… …. In July 2001, the fraud was uncovered when it was figured out that the numbers at American Tissue didn’t add up. Two months later, the company… …. Shortly before, the prosecutor had said in his closing arguments that it was com- pletely unreasonable to believe or even to consider that the CEO simply…
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  • eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

    Case 29: Infomatec (Germany, 2000)

    Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann
    …million”. However, the con- tract with Mobilcom was far from “at least” EUR 28 million, and it turned out later that the contract was worth less than EUR 5… …. The stock had plummeted after the company admitted it was disseminating a materially incorrect ad-hoc-bulletin about a supposed large-scale order… …to drive up the company’s stock price and then selling their own shares at peak prices. In addition to the deceptive press releases, it was further…
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  • eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

    Case 1: McKesson & Robbins (1938)

    Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann
    …. Another Musica brother, using the alias Robert Dietrich, was placed in charge of the shipping de- partment. He would forge shipping documents to make it… …bathroom, put a gun to his head and took his own life. His three younger brothers went to prison though. It was eventually discovered that USD 10 million… …more than USD 325 million, spread over the preceding three years. In 2001, the company as- sumed the name “McKesson Corporation”. Today, it is one of… …, pp. 86–90, 133, 236 “My God, Daddy, why did you do it?” Time Magazine, December 26, 1938 Progress, Time Magazine, April 10, 1939 The Ghost of…
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  • eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

    Case 14: Dynegy (2002)

    Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann
    …, Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse First Boston), but to make it appear that the loan was cash generated from operations. Boosting operations-based cash flow… …failed to disclose the true financing nature of the USD 300 million cash flow related to Project Alpha. Thus, it created the appearance that its… …operations were generating far more cash than they actually were. Furthermore, it concealed from the investing public the true extent of the gap between its…
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  • eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

    The Warning Signs of Fraud

    Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann
    …. Although the red flags cover a broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, it may be helpful to consider additional or different… …frequency of occurrence. And, to say it clearly, a positive answer to any of the following red flags does not necessarily imply that fraud has occurred… …controls over interim financial reporting) – Management override of controls – Ineffective IT department; ineffective accounting and information systems… …turnover rates of accounting, internal audit, compliance, or IT staff – No clear separation of duties – Inadequate system of authorization and approval of…
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