Suchergebnisse

• eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

  Case 20: AOL Time Warner (2002)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …entertainment giant headquartered in New York. The implied market value of the merged company was approximately USD 200 billion, making it the then-largest… …started to flatten. It was during this period that AOL engaged in accounting fraud to mask the fact that it was also beginning to experience a rapid… …for goods and services it purchased in exchange for the vendors’ purchases of online advertising in the same amount as the mark-up – “Business… …and services. In the third quarter of 2000, AOL paid PurchasePro USD 2 million for software licenses it neither needed nor intended to use. In… …parties it referred to PurchasePro entered into commercial arrangements with this company. AOL essentially paid third parties to Accounting Fraud in… …from PurchasePro, but falsified documents in order to create the appearance that it had actually referred third-party purchases to PurchasePro. In the… …these memberships as sub- scribers, although it knew that the memberships mostly would not be activated by the employees. The so-called “attach rates” –… …several instances, AOL counted bulk subscribers although it failed to complete the transactions within the respective quarters. In last-minute efforts to… …meet the quarterly targets, AOL shipped non-conforming membership kits to the customers prior to the quarter end – with the understanding that it would… …management of AOL Europe; for example, it caused its own designated directors and steering committee members to act in accordance with AOL’s directions. How-…

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  Case 21: HealthSouth (2003)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …, but hindsight proved otherwise. It be- came apparent that for many years, HealthSouth’s financial disclosures had neither represented economic reality… …country as well as in Australia, Puerto Rico, and the United Kingdom. It employed 51,000 workers and had generated USD 4.3 billion in reve- nue in 2002… …. But shortly after it had become publicly traded in 1986, the company had begun to artificially inflate its earnings to match analysts’ expectations and… …of Wall Street’s expectations, Scrushy would tell management to “fix it” by recording false earnings to make up the shortfall. (The conspirators also… …from hospitals and clinics, add bogus amounts at headquarters and blend it altogether. Thus, while the rehabilitation hospitals and medical centres… …tried to persuade CEO Scrushy to abandon it. But, according to the SEC complaint, Scrushy insisted that the scheme continue because he did not want the… …August 27, 2002, HealthSouth issued a press release stating that it expected Transmittal 1753 to reduce its annual earnings by approxi- mately USD 175… …an SEC accounting probe at the healthcare rehabilitation company. Following news of the probe, Standard & Poor’s announced that it lowered… …belonged in a psychiatric facility, not a rehab facility, but we had a bed available and we were encouraged to take them.” “In this sea of fraud, is it… …, Accounting Fraud in U.S. Companies 141 citing systematic deception on the part of HealthSouth’s executives. It was a well- conceived and -executed…

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  Case 22: Symbol Technologies (2004)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …in a variety of channel stuffing, known at the company as “three way candy deals”. It paid off smaller resellers to “purchase” Symbol products from a… …crimes (see SEC 2004): – They employed multiple schemes for claiming revenue before it was earned, such as shipping the wrong product when the… …to refrain from scanning new components or returned goods into SAP. Moreover, they arranged transactions with third parties to make it appear that… …Symbol had sold inventory when, in fact, it retained possession of the goods. – Finally, the manipulation of stock option exercise dates had a… …established unrealistic financial performance targets, and he made it clear to executives and employees at all levels that they were expected to do whatever… …it took to achieve those figures. According to the SEC, “there was often a mad scramble at the end of reporting periods to hit the numbers”. Many… …and made a strong commitment “to root out fraud”. It realized that Symbol’s only way to continue as a business was to sever all ties to those engaged… …it agreed to pay a USD 37 million penalty and continue a program to tighten its accounting controls. As part of its settlement of private shareholder…

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  Case 23: Computer Associates International (2004)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …corporations used its software products to run and manage their IT technology. At the time, Islandia, New York-based Computer Associates was the world’s… …began slowly (mainly because of the obstruction led by Computer Asso- ciates’ senior management), it steadily gained momentum in 2004. In January 2004… …participated in a scheme to inflate revenues and then lied to cover it up. He said senior management pressured him to lie, although he didn’t name names. In… …after the end of the quarter so that revenues could be counted a quarter earlier than it ought to have been. In all, the company prematurely reported… …, Accounting Fraud in U.S. Companies 150 when the company reported USD 557 million in revenues beyond the USD 1.047 billion it could properly claim. Thus… …kept scoring until it had all the points it needed to make every quarter look like a win.” Employees at Computer Associates also called the Extended… …million soft- ware license deal with a nearly insolvent customer. It then backdated the contract so it could be recorded in the prior quarter. In the next… …quarter, knowing that it would not be able to collect on the contract, Computer Associates reversed its internal records but did not publicly restate… …the first quarter of fiscal year 2001, it fell short of the Wall Street earnings estimate, and the share price dropped by more than 43% in a single day… …. This was only the second time in the company’s history that it missed Wall Street estimates. Until June 2000, Computer Associates also…

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  Case 24: AIG (2005)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …“Hank” Greenberg was credited with vastly expanding the company, turning it into one of the world’s largest and most revered insurance firms. For decades… …AIG were three primary areas of fraud (see SEC 2009): – Sham reinsurance transactions with General Re Corp. (“Gen Re”), in order to make it appear… …that AIG had increased its general loss reserves, when in fact it had not – A deal with an offshore special purpose entity called Capco Reinsurance Co… …boosted AIG’s net investment income and allowed it to improperly recognize capital gains Accounting Fraud in U.S. Companies 156 The “Gen… …it appear that Gen Re was paying AIG to share some of its claim risk. But investigators found no evidence of risk transfer from Gen Re to AIG. In… …analysts. The move helped AIG to persuade analysts that it was in better shape to pay claims, and helped to increase its share price. Without the phony… …. The SEC complaint said that AIG even lent the investors the money, hiding the loan by channelling it through various AIG subsidiaries. Using Capco to… …transactions in which it – appeared to redeem a portion of its interest in certain hedge funds back to the funds, – recorded the resulting cash payments… …financial results.” According to Spitzer, CFO Howard Smith ordered so-called “top-level adjustments” to AIG’s financial statements each quarter, to help it… …, after Greenberg and Smith were forced out by the board, AIG announced that it would restate many of its prior transactions. In addition, AIG stated that…

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  Case 25: Bernard Madoff (2008)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …understanding, as was the case with the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. It was the result of one of the simplest and one of the oldest embezzling schemes: a… …stunning fraud that appears to be of epic proportions”, and the Economist called it “the con of the century”. Needless to say, the unprecedented scope of… …older ones. The scheme lasted six months before it was uncovered. Today, the conception of such a scheme seems almost incomprehensible. Besides its… …returns. The SEC admitted that it had missed “repeated opportunities” to discover the fraud. It had received “credible and specific allegations regarding… …red flags was so long and unsettling that it should have raised serious concerns with regulators and potential investors (see Gregoriou/Lhabitant 2008… …Madoff’s purported track record was so good and so consistent that it should have been suspect. Based on mathematical probabilities, the average returns… …niece Shana served as the in-house legal council (it might be noteworthy that she was married to a lawyer who had served at the SEC and had repeatedly… …supervised inquiries about Bernard Madoff’s securities operations). In general, this heavy family influence should have been questioned, as it was an… …162 tions and required advisors to count each final investor as a client, Madoff still did not register. It was only after an SEC investigation that… …largest hedge fund is a fraud”. This time, the SEC followed up on his tips and investigated BMIS. But it found no evidence of a Ponzi scheme, just a few…

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  Case 26: Juergen Schneider (Germany, 1994)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …behaviour as a serious and important businessman. It also appeared that they were seduced into taking the risk by the promise of big profits. The scam ran… …verified something as basic as the size of the property it was lending on. Accounting Fraud in European Companies 166 Schneider also appeared… …explic- itly whether there were any supplementary contracts. Deutsche Bank claimed that it was the victim of systematic fraud. Hilmar Kopper, at the… …the affair proved to be very embarrassing for the bank. The report from the auditors, Wollert-Ellmendorff, supported Deutsche Bank’s argument that it… …had been crimi- nally deceived. But it also made clear that there had been complacency in the deal- ings with the property tycoon. There were several… …ensure that it was technically possible to construct a particular building and that the building costs were in relation to what was required. – All… …asked for a “transitional loan” in a letter received on April 7, 1994. It was in the spring of this year that Schneider began to face a string of… …it is possible that one individual can collect such a volume of debt in such a short time”. Schnei- der was arrested in Miami, Florida, in January… …1995. When he was returned to Germany in February 1996, the mass-circulation newspapers made it the big story of the day. “Hello, Mr. Schneider, Your… …just before it became impossible to stave off his creditors. The German media portrayed Juergen Schneider as a sophisticated con artist. But…

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  Case 27: Flowtex (Germany, 2000)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …precedent,” said judge Michael Meyer. He expressed his incredulity that the scam could have lasted for nearly ten years without being noticed. “It is amazing… …debts that needed to be covered.” Flowtex, based in Ettlingen near Karlsruhe in southern Germany, marketed horizon- tal drilling equipment. It… …each machine was fitted with the correct plates and documentation. It did not appear to strike KPMG as strange that machines they had chosen at… …bond to its customers as being “an attractive investment opportunity”. It would have been the first bond issue from a privately owned German… …their losses, which they refused to quantify. Why due diligence failed to expose the apparent Flowtex scam is still unclear. It is noteworthy that… …Flowtex case, said the complex structure of the Schmider-Kleiser group had “certainly played a role” in the deception. However, it emerged that KPMG… …pretend business. In 2002, the well-known auditing firm paid creditors of the bankrupt drilling equipment maker EUR 50 million. KPMG said that it made the… …against the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg after claiming that it failed to act in time against Schmider and Kleiser. The plaintiffs claimed that the tax… …records are examined before it issues securities. It is a textbook example of what can go wrong when banks and auditors place too much reliance on the…

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  Case 28: EM.TV (Germany, 2000)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …. When the company went public in 1997, it still had a tiny EUR 15 million in annual sales. It was one of the first companies to join the “Neuer Markt”… …and Americans wouldn’t have taken the company seriously. And Haffa was one of the most promi- nent examples of entrepreneurs in Germany who struck it… …. But in its chosen niche, cartoons and other children’s programming, it was already much bigger than its competitors. EM.TV controlled about one-third… …world of entertainment. Haffa showed that his prized German programs could make it everywhere else on the Continent. For example, the hit cartoon… …early 2000, shortly after a capital increase, EM.TV started an acquisition spree. For example, in February 2000, it acquired the Jim Henson Company… …forecast.” Haffa added that he would have never expected that it would be possible to be charged in a criminal court. In pleading for their acquittal… …was not executed till autumn. Kirch told the court that he had verbally agreed to the deal in mid-June 2000, and that he considered it to be “a fully… …jail sentence, but they did obtain a crimi- nal fine of EUR 1.2 million for Thomas Haffa and EUR 240,000 for Florian Haffa. It was important for the…

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  Case 29: Infomatec (Germany, 2000)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …million”. However, the con- tract with Mobilcom was far from “at least” EUR 28 million, and it turned out later that the contract was worth less than EUR 5… …. The stock had plummeted after the company admitted it was disseminating a materially incorrect ad-hoc-bulletin about a supposed large-scale order… …to drive up the company’s stock price and then selling their own shares at peak prices. In addition to the deceptive press releases, it was further…

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